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ABSTRACT 
As distributed network intrusion detection systems expand 
to integrate hundreds and possibly thousands of sensors, 
managing and presenting the associated sensor data becomes 
an increasingly complex task.  Methods of intelligent data 
reduction are needed to make sense of the wide dimensional 
variations.  We present a new signal primitive we call 
conversation exchange dynamics (CED) that accentuates 
anomalies in traffic flow. This signal provides an aggregated 
primitive that may be used by intrusion detection systems to 
base detection strategies upon.  Indications of the signal in a 
variety of simulated and actual anomalous network traffic 
from distributed sensor collections are presented.  
Specifically, attacks from the MIT Lawrence Livermore IDS 
data set are considered.  We conclude that CED presents a 
useful signal primitive for assistance in conducting IDS.  
 
Index Terms—Intrusion detection, network diagnostics, 
statistical mechanics.  
I. INTRODUCTION 
nderstanding network behavior for the purposes of 
diagnosis and intrusion detection is currently a major 
effort in the quest to build secure, robust and dependable 
computing systems. Specifically, intrusion detection 
systems (IDS) are detection security mechanisms that 
monitor a computer system or network, attempt to detect 
malicious activity, and raise an alarm to system or security 
administrators. IDSs can be classified as either anomaly-
based detection or signature-based detection [1]. The 
former approach detects anomalous behavior, which may 
be a superset of undesirable behavior, and generally 
suffers from high false alarm rates. The latter signature-
based approach may reduce false alarm rates but generally 
depends on a well-defined security policy to base 
detection on. Furthermore, signature-based intrusion 
detection systems are unable to detect events for which a 
signature is not defined in their signature database.  
The recent trend in intrusion detection is to deploy a 
large number of sensors throughout an organization’s 
network with the hope of gaining visibility into all areas of 
the network ([2],[3]). The unfortunate consequence of this 
approach is that the network administrator is overwhelmed 
with a plethora of somewhat information. Consequently, a 
new trend in IDS has developed in the area of data 
reduction [4]. 
We present a novel approach to modeling distributed 
system with a high number of interacting entities. This 
problem is notoriously complex, and our model seeks to 
provide some level of data reduction so as to distinguish 
what is an anomaly from what is typical network activity. 
Consequently, this technique has the potential to find 
applicability to a wide variety of systems (beyond 
computer network systems).  
Efforts related to our approach can be found in [5], [6] 
and [7]. These approaches all consider the problem from 
the abstraction of determining statistical properties of the 
network.  In this paper, however, we intend to focus on 
the analysis of the underlying state descriptors with the 
hope of extending these to global properties in the future. 
II. DESCRIBING NETWORK CONVERSATION FLOW 
As was stated before, the goal of our approach is to 
reduce standard network data into a useful, reproducible, 
and meaningful form, ultimately to allow accurate 
detection of network anomalies.  The notion of state will 
be more carefully defined below, but quickly summarizes 
into activity levels of various conversation groups within 
the network.  One end product is a real time three-
dimensional signal description of the configuration of the 
network.  
The network is constructed as a state space of 
information sources and sinks. As information quanta 
move throughout a network, the state space is updated 
accordingly. States are represented as a vector v
r
 of 
sources and sinks. The analogy used is that of buckets and 
balls. Information moves between nodes represented as 
buckets as indivisible balls. As the network moves 
information around, this is represented as balls being 
passed between buckets. For example, a series of n 
packets transmitted from a node Na to another node Nb 
would be modeled as n balls moved from bucket X and 
placed in bucket Y. The association of node Na with either 
bucket X or Y depends on the nature of the conversation. 
The bucket can be defined using any combination of 
conversation characteristics including the affiliation of 
who is talking (individual hosts or networks), the language 
they are speaking (TCP, UDP, or ICMP), or the job they 
are performing (client or server). 
In its simplest form, each node in a network is 
associated with one or more buckets and the total number 
of packets exchanged between nodes is modeled as 
moving balls from bucket to bucket. The collection of all 
buckets together with the allowable distribution range of 
balls forms a bucket state space.  
The bucket state space includes an initial distribution of 
balls among the buckets (corresponding to a computer 
network with an expected distribution of information). 
This initial distribution forms an initial condition for the 
bucket state space. Likewise, the allowable bucket state 
U 
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 spaces are assumed to be represented by a set of boundary 
conditions.  
A state transition causes a shift in the distribution of 
information between the buckets.  In other words, this 
model translates network behavior into bucket state 
transitions by selecting a ball from the bucket matching 
the source characteristics of the packet and moving that 
ball into the bucket matching the destination 
characteristics of the packet, thereby redistributing the 
information and transitioning the state. 
Figures 1 and 2 show the importance of the state walk, 
and how the model provides more information than a 
simpler model.  Both signals represent a state space walk 
made up of two conversation groups, bucket A and bucket 
B, and they start with 5 balls each.  As stated before, a 
network exchange can cause a state transition in three 
ways: by moving a ball from bucket A to bucket B, by 
moving a ball from bucket B to bucket A, or by either 
moving a ball from bucket A to bucket A or bucket B to 
bucket B, essentially resulting in no change for that 
period. 
 
 
Fig 1. A sample state walk for a two bucket model. (Top left) A plot of 
the state walk over time. (Top right) A plot of the bucket sizes over the 
course of the state walk. (Bottom) A ranked histogram of the bucket 
states over the entire time period of this state walk. 
 
The paths shown in the figure 1 and 2 share a few 
notable similarities.  The paths begin and end at the same 
state and undergo the same number and types of state 
changes, including five changes up, seven down, and four 
no changes.  However, the transitions that make up those 
changes produce remarkably different paths, shown on the 
left hand side of the figures, and those paths produce 
remarkably different state counts, shown on the right hand 
side of the figures.  Thus it is shown that this model 
provides a number of unique discriminators including 
number and type of state changes, starting and ending 
point and the general path in-between, and the state 
counts. 
By examining the manifold, or canyon, developed by 
collecting various state histograms over time, anomalies 
can be easily spotted as perturbations in the normal flow 
of the canyon. The cause of such dramatic changes in 
practice ranges from a single transition to many thousands 
of packets. 
An anomaly can cause one of two effects in the canyon 
signal.  Either new states are visited, or previously visited 
states are seen more often.  The first effect will cause a 
spike oriented along the z-axis and the latter along the y-
axis.  An anomaly that is orthogonal to the normal traffic 
flow will tend to cause a spike oriented along the z-axis, 
due to the new states visited.  An anomaly that is parallel 
to the normal traffic flow will tend to cause a spike 
oriented along the y-axis, due to the revisiting of 
previously visited states.  The magnitude of the potential 
spike is what determines the ability of the operator to 
detect the anomaly.  The orientation of the anomaly with 
respect to the normal traffic flow will determine the 
magnitude of the perturbation.  A single packet anomaly 
that is orthogonal to the normal traffic flow will cause a 
large perturbation in the signal, where a packet that is 
parallel to the normal traffic flow will cause a relatively 
small perturbation.  The less orthogonal the anomaly is to 
the normal traffic flow, the larger the number of 
anomalous packets required to cause a noticeable 
perturbation in the signal response.   
 
Fig 2. An alternative state walk for a same two bucket model as shown in 
fig 1. (Top left) A plot of the state walk over time. (Top right) A plot of 
the bucket sizes over the course of the state walk. (Bottom) A ranked 
histogram of the bucket states over the entire time period of this state 
walk. Note how the histogram varies for this state walk even though both 
examples end in the same state. 
 
For example, figure 3(a) represents all of the possible 
bucket states that are contained in the bucket state space 
for a system consisting of three buckets (a, b, and c) each 
containing four balls.  Each of the blue nodes represents a 
 different bucket state.  The number of balls in a given 
bucket is given by the lines parallel to the side opposite 
the vertex of interest.  Each of the vertices corresponds to 
the case where all of the balls are in the associated bucket.  
The purple node represents the initial ball distribution, or 
initial bucket state of {4,4,4} .  In figure 3(b), the 
number of balls in bucket ‘c’ is constant at four.  The thick 
green line represents the nine possible bucket states based 
on a conversation between the remaining two buckets. 
An example of the results of a single packet anomaly, 
that is orthogonal to the normal traffic flow, can be seen in 
figure 4.  In this case the packet caused a ball to move 
from bucket ‘c’ into the conversation between buckets ‘a’ 
and ‘b’.  The result is a new line of possible bucket states.  
This new line contains ten possible bucket states.  Given 
that the data from any given sample window is averaged 
over a historic window of time there are now nineteen 
possible bucket states, which is more than double the 
original number of nine.  This results in a run out (in the z-
axis direction) of the canyon signal.  This type of anomaly 
is very easy to detect even though it was caused by a 
single packet. 
a b
c
{a,b,c} = {x,8-x,4}
a b
c
{a,b,c} = {4,4,4}
(b)(a)  
Fig. 3. Graphics that depict the total bucket state space for a system 
containing three buckets each with four balls.  Each node corresponds to 
a different bucket state. – (a) The purple node corresponds to the bucket 
state of {4,4,4} . (b) The green line represents the range of possible 
bucket states for a conversation between buckets ‘a’ and ‘b’. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4. A graphic depicting the results of an anomalous packet that is 
orthogonal to the normal traffic flow.  The anomalous packet causes a 
ball to move from bucket ‘c’ into the conversation between buckets ‘a’ 
and ‘b’.  The results is the state walk moves from the line at 4c =  to 
the line at 3c = . 
 
The more orthogonal anomalous traffic is to the normal 
traffic flow, the greater effect the anomaly will have on 
the signal response.  Since it is not possible to know all 
the expected anomalous traffic in advance, the key is to 
create a collection of bucket spaces that provide a tight 
classification of critical traffic.  For example, traffic 
should be parsed by functional group, like web servers, as 
opposed to grouping servers and clients together.   
This notion of orthoganlity is illustrated in figure 5. In 
this example the signal response for two diametric attacks 
sorted through the bucket space are shown. This bucket 
space in particular is designed to show conversations of 
SMTP traffic. In the first, an ICMP denial of service 
attack shows insignificant response in the signal response. 
On the contrary, a mailbomb attack using the SMTP 
protocol clearly identifies the anomalous SMTP traffic. 
 
 
 
Fig. 5. (Top) Signal response of an orthogonal attack (ICMP flood) 
against a bucket space monitoring e-mail exchanges (SMTP). (Bottom) 
Signal response of a mailbomb attack against the same mail server. 
There is a limit to the number of buckets a 
configuration can have, ideally, multiple instances of the 
system should be run concurrently to allow for smaller 
bucket spaces.  This is also beneficial in reducing the 
complexity of interpreting the signal space which 
increases with the number of buckets. The next section 
presents some of the analysis on actual network traffic. 
a b
c
{x,8-x,4} {x,9-x,3}
x
y
 III. EXPERIMENTATION AND ANALYSIS 
This section is divided into two parts: controlled 
experiments conducted laboratory test equipment and 
results from real traffic on operational networks.  
A. Laboratory experiments 
The purpose of these experiments was to show how the 
bucket state histogram varies as the bucket space 
description deviates from the actual network 
configuration. Two categories of experiments are 
discussed. The first shows the effect of an increasing 
number of rogue web servers on the bucket space 
histogram. The second shows the effect of a single out-of-
profile packet on the bucket space histogram. 
The simulation network consisted of a trusted subnet of 
10 web servers connected to an untrusted internet of 1000 
clients. In order to simulate typical network traffic, Spirent 
TeraMetrics traffic generators running TeraCaw software 
were used.  This system is capable of simulating millions 
of client/server sessions using various application level 
protocols, beyond the initial three-way handshake.  The 
system was configured such that any where between 400 
and 800 users (using the 100 client machines) would 
randomly access the 10 web servers.  Each web access 
consisted of establishing a TCP connection with the 
server, an HTTP GET message and then a 64-byte HTTP 
Response message.  The connection was then terminated 
with a RESET. 
The bucket space definition included a list of 
“authorized” web servers, identified an address space 
associated with trusted users, and considered ports below 
1024 to be service ports. Consequently, for figures 5 
through 9 the bucket space was partitioned as follows: 
1. A trusted IP address, a web server, and a service port 
2. A trusted IP address, a web server, and not a service port 
3. A trusted IP address, not a web server, and a service port 
4. A trusted IP address, not a web server, and not a service 
port 
5. Not a trusted IP address and a service port 
6. Not a trusted IP address and not a service port 
 
The number of possible bucket states, N, can be 
determined as: 
1
1
n k
N
n
+ − =  −                                 (1) 
where n is the number of buckets and k is the number of 
balls in the system.  Thus for the experiments above, with 
six buckets and initially four balls each (k = 24), there are 
theoretically N = 118,755 possible bucket states. 
In the control run the bucket space description matches 
the actual network topography. Figure 5 illustrates the 
average bucket sizes and bucket space histograms over a 
period of two minutes (120 seconds). The typical load on 
the network was approximately 1000 packets per second. 
The bucket histogram is shown at two scales in this 
example.   
Since the bucket space definition is aligned with the 
actual traffic patterns, the number of non-zero bucket 
states is small. Hence the histogram tail is very short. 
Perhaps more importantly, this display also illustrates 
the smoothing effect defined by the central limit theorem 
on traffic that has been shown to be highly self-similar in 
nature on a per-client basis ([8], [9]).  In other words, even 
though all clients arguably have the same heavy-tailed 
exchange characteristics, the actual distribution of states 
as shown by the bucket state histograms is highly normal 
and smooth, particularly when the bucket definitions are 
aligned with the configuration (i.e. all web servers in the 
web server list). 
Next an anomalous packet was injected into the 
network for each during the above scenario.  The 
anomalous packet was an UDP packet from one of the 
web servers to one of the clients.  The packet originated 
from an ephemeral port (1025) with a destination service 
port on the client (53). Figure 6 shows the effect on the 
bucket state histogram for this packet a scales comparable 
to figure 5. 
 
 
Fig 5.The bucket state histogram over time. Decreasing frequency of 
bucket states comes out of the graphic. Traffic is confined to external 
clients visiting internal web servers so the number of bucket states is 
small. 
 
 
Fig 6. The bucket state histogram with a single UDP injected into the 
over 200,000 web traffic packets. Compare to figure 5. 
 
The difference caused by the anomaly of the UDP 
packet should be readily apparent when comparing figures 
5 and 6. Keep in mind that during this two minute period, 
over 200,000 packets were exchanged. The reason for the 
significant protrusion is because the UDP packet forces a 
ball to be transferred to a state that would not otherwise be 
 visited, reducing the counts of the “normal” buckets and 
altering the frequency of the histograms (hence the notch 
in the signal response.) 
The second experiment illustrates the effect when one 
web server removed from the configuration file. This web 
server is now in effect an unauthorized or rogue web 
server. The top graphic in figure 7 shows the effect of 
pulling the single server out of the web server group.  
One immediately notes the significant variation in the 
bucket state histogram when compared to figure 5.  This is 
due to the self-similar nature of the requests made to the 
single rogue web server. This hypothesis becomes more 
evident in lower graphics of figure 7 where two, four and 
six web servers are removed from the “web server” list. 
As we might expect, the increasing number of rogue 
servers invokes the central limit theorem, producing an 
increasingly smooth display. We do see and increasingly 
larger number of active bucket states, however, due to the 
larger variation in traffic characteristics. 
 
 
Fig 7. Bucket state histograms after the removal of one (top, left), two 
(top, right), four (bottom, left) and six (bottom, right) web servers from 
the web server list.  Note the difference between these and the middle of 
figure 7. As we remove more web servers from the “authorized” list we 
see increasing smoothness in the display but also and increase in 
frequency of bucket states. 
Next a single UDP packet was injected into all of the 
scenarios of figure 7. The resulting displays are found in 
figure 8. Note how the UDP packet gets completely lost in 
the variable traffic of a single server removed, but is still 
quire prominent in all the others. 
 
 
Fig 8. Bucket state histograms for the traffic in figure 7 with a single 
UDP injected amongst the 200,000 packets. Histograms shown after the 
removal of one (top, left), two (top, right), four (bottom, left) and six 
(bottom, right) web servers from the web server list. 
B. DARPA Lincoln Lab IDS Test Data  
For analysis and configuration of the system we utilized 
the Tcpdump files that were collected by Lincoln Labs 
using their 1999 Simulation Network.  Per references [10], 
the simulation network was created to conduct evaluations 
of intrusion detection systems by measuring detections 
and false alarm rates. 
Figure 9 shows the response to attack #41213446, an 
ICMP flood or “Smurf” attack.  This attack is very 
common and generally easy to detect. 
 
Fig. 9 Response of the system to an ICMP flood, #41213446. 
 
 Figure 10 displays the response to a Mailbomb attack, 
#42155148.  This is a denial of service attack directed 
against the sendmail program.  This is accomplished by 
sending a unique set of strings to the sendmail server. 
 
Fig 10. Response of the system to a Mailbomb attack, #42155148. 
 
 A similar type of attack to the Mailbomb is the Apache2 
attack, #51140100. The response of the system to this 
attack is shown in Figure 11. 
 
 
Fig. 11. Response of the system to an Apache2 attack, #51140100. 
 
Finally, the response of the system to a sweep of IP 
addresses is shown in figure 12.  The shape of this 
response is particularly worth noting. 
  
 
Fig. 12. Response of the system to an IP sweep, #52211313. 
C. Operational network observations 
Figure 13 depicts a flood of ICMP packets originating 
inside a monitored operational network after normal 
working hours.  This flood increased the state count; 
thereby producing a large spike on the GUI.  This flood 
consisted of 6,032 ICMP echo requests/replies within a 
four second time frame.  ICMP echo requests and replies 
are not necessarily anomalous, however the owner of the 
system was logged off and at home requiring notification 
of the local CERT for further investigation. 
 
 
Fig 13. An anomalous event observed on an operational network. 
Specifically a flood of ICMP packets was released from an internal client 
over a four second period. 
 
 
Fig. 14. Response of the system to the Code Red attack indicated by the 
red circle, followed by the subsequent action of shutting down the 
firewall by the network administrator. 
 
 
Figure 14 illustrates the response due to the Code Red 
worm in August 2002.  This example is particularly 
interesting in that it show how the character of the 
network changed twice – once when the worm breached 
the school’s network and then when the firewall was 
shutdown due to detection of the breach.  
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
We have presented a novel approach to characterizing 
the conversation flow of a computer network using an 
intelligent form of data reduction based on an Ehrenfest 
urn model.  This approach associates traffic of certain 
characteristics with a category or bucket and observes the 
transfer of information from one category to another. 
Revealing behavior is identified by viewing the histogram 
of the bucket states, or category arrangements, over time.  
The approach has been evaluated on both simulated 
laboratory traffic and operational network traffic. 
More importantly, the experiments demonstrated how 
this approach produces events that can be characterized by 
Gaussian models. While most anomaly detectors try to 
apply ML techniques to heavy tailed distributions (e.g. 
looking at packet length), our approach produces a 
statistic that can justifiably be analyzed with ML/MSE 
estimators. 
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